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11. Introduction
In the second half of the 1970s, after almost fifty years of authoritarian rule, the
longest lasting European dictatorships of the twentieth century were finally replaced
by democratic governments. An intense program of structural reforms was then
initiated in Portugal and Spain which intended to rescue the two countries from
chronic, long-standing backwardness. The primary goal was of course to restore
democracy and the democratic institutions, including free trade unionism and free
collective bargaining. The second major goal was EEC membership, which required
the introduction of comprehensive free-market mechanisms.
These were indeed the two crucial aspects that framed the first phase of the transition
program in the Iberian Peninsula, that is, the period before EEC accession in 1986.
The post-1986 period was a time when both countries intensified their programs of
reform in order to narrow the gap, in per capita income, between themselves and the
more advanced and industrialised central and northern European countries.
In this paper we analyse the impact of economic (and political) transition in Portugal
and Spain on labour market institutions and employment regulations and,
subsequently, on labour market outcomes. We focus, in particular, on the transition
process towards a modern system of industrial relations. Analysis of the effects of
structural reforms on major labour market outcomes in Portugal and Spain will then
be used to discuss the case of Poland, with an emphasis on the process of labour
adjustment and labour reallocation following 1989’s breathtaking transition program.
The paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we summarise the main changes in
labour market regulations and institutions that have occurred in the Iberian countries,
especially in terms of employment protection rules. In section 3, we discuss the
major labour market outcomes during the transition period, including the role of
fixed-term contracts in employment adjustment and labour reallocation issues,
namely in relation to the overall measures of job protection. Section 4 puts Poland in
perspective, that is, it analyses the size of restructuring and the role of labour market
institutions, using the Iberian experience as a benchmark. Section 5 presents the
concluding remarks.
2. Main Changes in Labour Regulations and Institutions in
Portugal and Spain
During the dictatorial regimes of Salazar (in Portugal) and Franco (in Spain), trade
unions were never recognised as independent bargaining partners, neither at sector
nor firm level negotiations. Although minor changes during the sixties allowed
workers to choose their representatives directly, industrial relations in both countries
were dominated by single employer-employee organisations at industry level –
official organisations to which employers and employees were forced to accept
compulsory membership. No right to strike or lock-out was recognised, and direct
2intervention by the state, either by sanctioning or refusing to sanction free-
established agreements, was the rule.
Firing and hiring practices were highly regulated in Spain, with dismissals being
mostly driven by political considerations and mobility strongly discouraged by strict
regulations on hiring, while fixed-term contracts were restricted to strictly temporary
and seasonal jobs. In Portugal, the government used to be able to refuse the
publication of any collective agreement, but between 1969 and 1974 there was a
system of collective bargaining in place that included independent conflict
arbitration. This practice was important because it sowed the seeds of labour
organisation in the post-dictatorship period. Workers with a permanent contract were
also dominant in Portugal, but firing and hiring were, by law, at-will, subject to
severance payments and advance notice. Fixed-term contracts were allowed in a
wide range of circumstances as well, but covering only a tiny portion of workers.
In Portugal, workers’ rights to organise and participate in collective bargaining and
the right to strike were introduced in 1975-1976. The law regulating works councils
came in 1979, but since 1974 workers have been actively participating in the day-to-
day management of numerous firms, especially in the expanding public sector. Wage
bargaining and the negotiation of employment conditions at work were mostly
conducted at the sector-level, with only a small fraction of firms covered by firm-
level agreements. Centralised, tripartite agreements (including the government, trade
unions, and employers’ organisations), came into effect just before Portugal’s
accession to the EEC in 1986, when its democracy became better established.
The second phase of the transition in Portugal began in 1986, with new challenges
arising from increased economic integration, which, in a first wave, launched a
further reduction in agricultural employment, followed by the privatisation of key
state-owned firms and the transformation of a manufacturing- (and agriculture-)
based economy into a service-based economy.
Unlike Portugal in its early stages of transition to democracy, Spain did not undergo
massive nationalisation of its key sectors nor was it under the threat of becoming a
“people’s democracy” (i.e. a European version of Cuba). With a much smoother
start, the Spanish transition process really seemed to shadow that of Portugal, except
for possibly one important point: the centralised tripartite bargaining, which in Spain
started in 1978 with the Moncloa Agreements. Portugal did not have its first social
pact signed until 1986 (Acordos de Concertação). Stable political majorities also
occurred first in Spain, with three victories from the PSOE (the socialist party) in
1982, 1986, and 1989. The first single-party majority in Portugal came in 1987.
Since then both countries have been ruled by single-party majorities.
Not surprisingly, the first part of the transition process (that is, before accession to
the EEC) was characterised in both countries by strong government activism in all
areas including the labour market. During dictatorship rule, labour contracts had, in
principle,  an  indefinite  duration  (open-ended  contracts),  but none of the countries
3Table 2.1. Introduction and revision of major labour legislative packages
Portugal Spain
Introduction Major revision Introduction Major revision
Individual dismissals (a) 1975 1989 1980 1997
Collective dismissals 1976 1989 1980 1994
Fixed-Term contracts 1976 1989 1984 1992 and 1993
Unemployment insurance 1975 1985 Late 1970s 1992
Note: (a) Until 1989 (1997), individual dismissals based upon economic reasons were not
allowed in Portugal (Spain).
ever made the principle of job security explicit. As a matter of fact, in Portugal,
despite dominant, paternalistic (and corporatist) principles, the law did allow firms to
shed labour at will. This regime could not of course survive the revolutionary turmoil
and was removed in 1975, triggering a huge transformation process in which the
system of industrial relations literally changed its face in a period of less than three
years.
Table 2.1 indicates the timing of the introduction of major labour legislative
packages in both countries i.e. individual dismissals, collective dismissals, fixed-
term contracts, and unemployment insurance benefits. In all cases, it is clear that the
legislative changes in Portugal were introduced earlier than in Spain. In particular,
the timing of the first three items must be underscored. As mentioned earlier, in
Portugal, the laws regarding firing-at-will were abolished in 1975, but the timing of
the new legislation regarding collective dismissals and fixed-term contracts does
show some relation with the process of labour adjustment in a period of intense
industrial restructuring, which included nationalisation of the key sectors of the
economy (in 1975) and the loss of protected export markets in the former African
colonies (in 1974, 1975 and 1976). Thus, in accordance with the new regime of
fixed-term contracts, firms were free to shed labour with no risk of being challenged
in court on the grounds of unfair dismissal, while the new system of collective
dismissals imposed a low threshold of 2 (5) workers in firms with less (more) than
50 workers and legal severance payments clearly below international standards. (It
should also be pointed out that, contrary to Spain, there is no evidence of any
systematic gap between agreed and legal severance payments in Portugal).
The major revision of Portuguese labour legislation came in 1989. The new regime
eased individual dismissals by allowing firing for economic reasons, but new
restrictions were introduced on fixed-term contracts, making very clear the purpose
of combining lower restrictions on individual dismissals with tougher regulations on
fixed-term contracts. Specifically, the new law on fixed-term contracts established
eight statutory reasons for concluding a fixed-term contract.  In most general cases,
the maximum duration was limited to three years and the number of renewals to two.
4Legislation on collective dismissals was also eased, namely by lifting administrative
authorisation (only the consultation requirement was maintained).
In Spain, single unions, incorporating both workers and employers in each industry,
were the key feature of the labour relations system, as Franco’s Workers’ Statutes
removed all workers rights to representation and collective bargaining. However, as
in Portugal, very small moves toward free negotiation in the late sixties were
decisive in future developments because they allowed emerging and independent
union activity.
The first major revision of Franco’s Workers’ Statutes was made in 1980, five years
after Franco’s death. Meanwhile, the principle of job security (just-cause dismissals)
was established in the law by the Industrial Relations Act of 1976, while genuine
unions, the freedom of negotiation, and the right to strike and lock-out obtained
constitutional recognition in 1978.
Between 1976 and 1980, there were also some changes to the Francoist regulations
on fixed-term contracts, but the law remained highly restrictive, with the major
restrictions were only lifted in 1984. According to the new law, fixed-term contracts
could be used in any activity (temporary or not) and signed for periods of at least 6
months (one year in 1992), and the total duration could not exceed 3 years (4 years in
1993). Upon expiration of the last renewal, the contract becomes of indefinite
duration or the worker is fired. In the case of firing, the worker cannot appeal to
labour courts, but firms must wait one year before hiring another person for the same
position on a fixed-term contract basis. Following the introduction of this regime,
there was a massive increase in the proportion of non-permanent workers: 11.3 % in
1985 and 32.2% in 1991.
Until 1994, collective redundancies in Spain required a minimum threshold of 2
workers within a month for firms with less than 50 employees. They were subject,
however, to prior administrative authorisation and consultation with employee
representatives, with labour authorities requiring in general prior agreement from
workers representatives. Approval of a redeployment plan for displaced workers was
also required, especially in the case of large corporations. Severance entitlements
were set to 20 days per year of service, but firms usually agreed to pay well-above
the legal minimum to avoid lengthy procedures and unfavourable court decisions.
Spain started its program of labour reforms in 1994. Firstly, by changing the law on
collective dismissals, adding to the previous economic and technological reasons the
organisational and production causes (consultation and authorisation requirements
were retained), and secondly, in 1997, by introducing a new system of individual
dismissals in which economic, technological, and organisational reasons (including
changes in cyclical demand) constitute justifiable grounds for dismissal.
Finally, we present the main legislative initiatives with respect to the unemployment
insurance system. Unemployment benefits were first introduced in Portugal in 1975.
5Maximum entitlement was a fixed value prior to 1985, but in that year it became a
function of the years of service worked, inter al. From their inception in 1975 until
1984 unemployment benefits in Portugal were unrelated to past earnings and were
fixed in terms of the minimum wage (introduced in May 1974). From 1985,
however, benefits have been partly earnings related. Between 1985 and 1988
inclusive, the unemployed worker received 65% of previous earnings for six months
plus a further month’s benefit set at the same rate for each year of service. From
1989, benefits became payable at 65% of past earnings for 16.5 months (for a worker
with 10 years of service), and at a certain proportion of the minimum wage
thereafter. Eligibility requirements for insurance benefits were fixed at 18 months of
work in the previous 2 years. Combining insurance and assistance benefits, the
maximum duration of unemployment benefits for a worker with 10 years of service
was 6, 12, 15, 31, and 25 months in 1975, 1977, 1983, 1985, and 1989, respectively.
The unemployment benefit system in Spain is also divided into insurance and
assistance benefits. The first is earnings related and the employee must have worked
for at least 6 months in the previous 4 years (in 1992, it was changed to 12 months in
the previous 6 years).  The eligibility time scale for a worker with 10 years of
service, for example, is 2 years, receiving 80% of the gross wage during the first 6
months, 70% from month 7 to month 12, and 60% thereafter. (70% in the first 6
months and 60% thereafter in 1992). The assistance benefit requirement is 3 months
of work prior to unemployment and then the worker receives 75% of the minimum
wage for up to 18 months (for a worker of less than 45 years of age with no
dependents).
This description is an oversimplification of the Portuguese and Spanish
unemployment benefit systems. Indeed much more would be required to fully
describe a complex system of benefits that vary widely across individual types. On
the whole, however, it seems that the Portuguese system is not as generous as the
Spanish one as: a) it has, in general, stricter eligibility rules; b) it has lower
replacement ratios; and c) it imposes a lower maximum period of time for both
insurance and assistance benefits. It should however be pointed out that the impact of
legal provisions on unemployment benefits must be tempered by actual (effective)
coverage rates, which, in both countries, are clearly below the OECD average. The
OECD Jobs Study (OECD, 1994), for example, reports that for Portugal and Spain,
in 1991, the percentage of unemployed people reporting receipt of benefit in the EC
Labour Force Survey (LFS) was 17% and 29%, respectively (the ratio of the number
of registered unemployment beneficiaries to the total number of unemployed (LFS)
is 41% and 59%, respectively). (Annex Tables 1 and 2 in the appendix show the
main aspects regarding individual and collective dismissal laws, fixed-term contracts,
temporary agency work and unemployment benefits).
6Table 3.1. Employment by sector and labour market outcomes in Portugal and Spain:
1975-93
Portugal Spain
1975 1985 1993 1975 1985 1993
AGR 0.34 0.24 0.11 0.22 0.18 0.10
IND 0.34 0.34 0.33 0.38 0.32 0.31
SER 0.32 0.42 0.56 0.40 0.50 0.59
1975-77 1978-85 1986-93 1975-77 1978-85 1986-93
EMPPOP 0.400 0.403 0.442 0.346 0.299 0.307
UNRATE 0.062 0.080 0.056 0.048 0.146 0.187
LFPR 0.427 0.438 0.468 0.363 0.351 0.379
Source: Addison, Teixeira, and Grosso (2000), OECD Main Economic Indicators, and
OECD (1999). AGR, IND, and SER denote agriculture, industry, and services, respectively.
EMPPOP is the employment-population ratio and is obtained dividing total employment by
total population; UNRATE is the OECD standardised unemployment ratio; and LFPR is the
labour force participation ratio (the ratio of total labour force to total population).
3. Employment protection and labour market outcomes during
transition
In this section we discuss how the changes described above, in labour market
institutions and legislation have made an impact on the development of labour
markets in Portugal and Spain. We begin by looking at the size of economic
restructuring and major labour market outcomes during the period 1975-93: post-
dictatorship (1975-77), pre-EEC accession (1978-85), and post-EEC accession
(1986-93). Then we assess the role of fixed-term contracts with respect to
employment and wage flexibility and finally discuss the connection between job
security provisions and labour market reallocation.
3.1. The size of restructuring
As shown in Table 3.1., restructuring (that is, the shift from agriculture to services)
was very intensive in both countries, with employment in agriculture being more
than halved in Spain and reduced by 2/3 in Portugal (it is still twice the OECD
average). On the other hand, employment and labour force participation ratios have
been increasing in Portugal and are clearly higher than in Spain by more than a
margin of 10%. The developments in the unemployment front are also in sharp
contrast, with the unemployment rate in Spain being two to three times higher than in
Portugal.
7Table 3.2. Output and employment growth rates and labour productivity: 1978-96
1978-85 1986-96
Portugal Spain Portugal Spain
Output 2.3  1.0 3.3 2.8
Employment 0.9 -1.8 0.4 0.9
Labour productivity 1.4  2.8 2.9 1.9
Source: Bentolila and Blanchard (1990), and OECD (1999).
What then are the reasons for such differences in the impact of restructuring? After
all, and despite differences in economic openness at the beginning of the transition
process (Portugal has been a member of the EFTA since 1960), the oil crisis had
apparently the same effect on both countries, causing excess capacity in highly
protected domestic industries (in basic industries, for example) and the wage
dispersion, a pre-requisite to faster labour reallocation, was similar to that in the early
1970s.
A very popular explanation for labour market failure in Spain, especially with respect
to unemployment and labour force participation rates, is that firms were forced to
accommodate the oil shock and the increased competition from abroad, without
being allowed to adjust their labour input. As a result, when major labour market
restrictions were lifted, in the mid-1980s, firms just got rid of unneeded workers very
quickly, while less efficient firms had no option other than to close down. According
to this view, what happened then was a huge process of labour shedding (Bentolila
and Blanchard, 1990).
A rough measure of labour shedding can be shown by looking at the evolution of
employment and output per employee (labour productivity) at both the aggregate and
sector levels. We begin by presenting aggregate data for the two sub-periods 1978-85
and 1986-96, in Table 3.2.
In both sub-periods, the average output growth was higher in Portugal. The most
striking difference between the two economies is, however, the sizeable reduction of
employment levels in Spain in the period before EEC accession (-1.8%, annual
average).
Figure 3.1. uses common scale plots to show the behaviour of output and
employment over the 1975-97 period (OECD quarterly data). This indicates that both
output and employment show greater volatility in Portugal. In turn, Figure 3.2. shows
the growth rates of employment and output. If employment and output mirror each
other, the data points will lie close to a 45º line. Panel (a) of Figure 3.2., represents
the entire period, while panels (b) and (c) present sub-periods 1978-85 and 1986-97.
8Figure 3.1. Employment and output growth in Portugal (1977-97)
(a) Employment growth
                            Portugal                                                                   Spain
(b) Output growth
In all cases, the slope seems to be steeper in Portugal, that is, changes in output are
larger than changes in employment. In other words, the same output growth seems to
imply lower employment growth in Portugal.
A different indicator of the importance of restructuring, suggested by Bentolila and
Blanchard (1990) is presented in Figure 3.3., where labour productivity growth is
plotted against employment growth in two sub-periods: 1977-85 and 1986-93. The
exercise allows us to establish whether there is any visible correlation between the
two variables, and, although simple, it gives a rough indication whether supply or
demand shocks have prevailed. If supply shocks (taken as proxy for restructuring)
are dominated by demand shocks, then a positive correlation should be expected;
otherwise the correlation will be negative.
To carry out this exercise, we used nine two-digit manufacturing sectors. As Figure
3.3. shows, the correlation between labour productivity and employment growth rates
is negative in both sub-samples, particularly in the period prior to EEC accession (in
this period, the regression coefficient is -0.76, with a standard error of 0.60).
Juxtaposing with Bentolila and Blanchard’s findings for Spain, obtained from a sub-
set of 14 manufacturing industries in the period 1979-85, it is clear that the size of
restructuring, at least during the period before accession to the EEC, was higher in
Portugal. (The regression coefficient in the case of Spain is -0.14).
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9Figure 3.2. Employment and output growth rates in Portugal and Spain
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Figure 3.3. Employment and labour productivity growth rates in Portugal – two-digit
manufacturing sectors (scatter diagrams with regression lines)
                           (a) 1977-85                                                          (b) 1986-93
3.2 The role of fixed-term contracts
As mentioned above, in 1984 there were substantial reductions in firing costs in
Spain, with the new law lifting important restrictions on fixed-term contracts.
Introduced explicitly to improve employment flexibility, liberalisation of fixed-term
contracts was expected to induce greater employment fluctuations over the cycle, but
there was also the concern that it might imply less wage flexibility and higher wage
compression.
Indeed, the introduction of a flexible system of fixed-term contracts into a system of
labour relations dominated by core permanent workers (dominant in terms of wage
bargaining, for example) could have risked creating a segmented market of insiders
(workers with open-ended contracts, highly protected against dismissal) and
outsiders (atypical workers with fixed-term contracts but with low firing costs),
without any discernible reduction in labour costs or improvement in wage flexibility.
Although Francoist restrictions on hiring and firing practices were very pronounced,
the combination of high wage dispersion and flexible wages was believed to have
resulted in low unemployment. The concern was therefore that, by imposing lower
wage dispersion and tighter labour regulations, powerful trade unions, created in the
wake of Franco’s death, would produce an explosive combination of labour
regulations, with an extremely negative impact on labour market performance.
Using manufacturing data at firm level, Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1992) provide a
substantive test on the hypothesis that fixed-term contracts imply greater cyclical
variability of labour demand. The evidence is not conclusive, but there seems to be
some indication that firms in expansion tend to adjust more quickly to unexpected
changes in demand, that is, that employment inertia is slightly lower during periods
of expansion.
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The impact on wages is a little more difficult to estimate, mainly because of
composition effects arising from the absence of accurate information on wages of
both types (permanent and non-permanent workers). If, as Bentolila and Dolado
(1994) argue, fixed-term contract workers are easy to hire, we would expect an
increase in the proportion of non-permanent workers, making labour costs lower.
Once this proportion stabilises and firms are happy with the mix of non-permanent
and permanent workers, the latter may become more concerned with wages,
implying an increase in labour costs. (The probability of being fired decreases and, as
a consequence, they become less concerned with their level of employment).
Permanent workers may also become less co-operative with non-permanent workers,
which implies additional wage increases. If, however, non-permanent workers
threaten not to co-operate in wage bargaining or in labour disputes, for example,
labour costs will tend to decrease. In short, the net effect is not known (and there are
serious econometric obstacles to a correct identification of these different
components).
These caveats aside, Bentolila and Dolado concluded that the liberalisation of fixed-
term contracts without any changes in regular contracts has resulted in higher labour
costs and increased wage rigidity. As predicted, it seems that, following the
liberalisation of fixed-term contracts, firms decided to increase the proportion of
non-permanent workers in total employment, implying lower labour costs. However,
as the proportion of non-permanent workers stabilised, trade unions, dominated by
permanent workers, have tended to ask for higher wages. Although uncooperative
behaviour from non-permanent workers in labour disputes might work in the
opposite direction, the threat to be uncooperative with non-permanent workers, who
are higher-skill/higher-productivity workers, and the lower weight given to
employment seems to have been the dominant effect, resulting in a bigger share of
the economic rents going to permanent workers and higher labour costs overall.
More importantly, perhaps, in this scenario if any negative shock in demand arises,
non-permanent workers will be forced to bear all the adjustment costs.
In section 2 we mentioned that in Portugal the fixed-term contract legislation was
introduced in 1976, following the defeat of hard-line trade unionism. The
introduction of fixed-term contracts in Portugal coincided with a system of collective
dismissals, which was relatively favourable to firms (by international standards).
This means that the flexible component brought in by the new regime was thus of
much less importance than in Spain, which is corroborated by the greater cyclical
variability of non-permanent workers in Portugal. Not surprisingly, wages have also
shown greater flexibility and increasing dispersion, which is an additional sign that
transition to a more flexible regime of labour relations was accomplished to a greater
degree (in the sense that mobility costs born by workers were matched by higher
wage differentials). As Table 3.3. shows, in 1993 only the U.S.A. presented a larger
D9/D5 ratio than Portugal. Portugal has also shown the biggest increase in wage
dispersion measured by the D9/D5 and D5/D1 ratios.
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Table 3.3. Earnings inequality in selected countries
1985 1989 1991 1992 1993 Late 1980s
D9/D5 D5/D1
Portugal
  D9/D5 2.14 2.24 2.24 2.48 2.47
  D5/D1 1.69 1.56 1.56 1.61 1.64
Italy 1.56 1.33
Germany 1.65 1.39
France 2.11 1.52
U.K. 1.96 1.64
Canada 1.75 2.27
U.S.A. 2.14 2.63
Source: OECD (1993) and OECD (1996). D9/D5 is the ratio of the upper limit of the ninth
decile to the upper limit of the fifth decile; similarly for D5/D1. Larger figures indicate
more inequality.
3.3. The role of job security provisions
We offer in this section some brief remarks on the relationship between reported
measures of (overall) employment protection and labour market developments. We
also focus on labour reallocation issues. Due to data limitations, cross-country
comparisons of job turnover flows will be established using all seven OECD
countries included in Table 3.3.
Striking differences between European and North-American labour markets have
inspired many attempts to find a solid relationship between the stringency of labour
regulations and major labour markets outcomes. In this literature, spurred on by the
work of Lazear (1990), job security provisions typically have a negative impact on
employment creation, unemployment, and labour force participation. Methodological
and data problems have nevertheless been so important in these studies that the
findings should be taken very cautiously, and while replication can be one answer
(e.g. Addison, Teixeira, and Grosso, 2000), the clear trade-off between the length of
the time-series and the comprehensiveness of labour protection indices has warned
researchers that progress in this area will be slower that expected.
In any case, and everything else being constant, higher employment protection is
expected to lead to lower gross job turnover as firms are more reluctant to fire and
hire over the cycle. The cross-country evidence seems, however, to be at odds with
this prediction, because, as we will see below, inspection of gross flows does not
reveal any clear pattern distinguishing high-protection from low-protection countries
– at least using OCDE ‘reputation’ indices, which incidentally are not immune to
criticism (see Addison, Teixeira, and Grosso, 2000, and Addison and Teixeira,
2001).
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While it is true that cross-country comparisons of job and worker flows are hard to
make (poorly measured data is the most common source of error), the absence of any
significant differences between countries with very distinct score levels of job
protection raises two critical issues. The first is related to the enforcement of labour
regulations: one cannot exclude in particular the possibility of rigid regulations being
circumvented in practice by workers and firms (Bertola et al., 1999). Secondly, and
perhaps more importantly, labour reallocation is a function of industrial labour
relations as a whole, which means that focusing on firing restrictions and not directly
taking into account wage setting behaviour, inter al., might be misleading.
A useful perspective is given by Bertola and Rogerson (1997). According to these
authors, the apparent paradox of distinct labour systems generating similar job
turnover flows can be explained by taking firing restrictions together with the wage
determination process. Indeed, countries with higher firing restrictions are the most
likely to have lower wage differentials and higher wage rigidity (lower wage
variations), with the latter inducing higher job turnover throughout the cycle
(especially employer-initiated job turnover).  However, if wage uniformity leads to
higher job turnover, and workers are concerned with the volatility of labour income,
then they will lobby for restrictions on firing practices. Conversely, if firing costs are
high, firms will tend to reduce wages, making them more variable. Workers who are
averse to taking risks will then lobby for wage compressing legislation. Higher job
protection and wage uniformity will then be the expected outcome and hence a larger
job turnover will be observed even when job protection rules are very strict.
A distinct issue is whether restrictions on firing affect unemployment flow values.
As high firing costs affect labour market allocations, there is in principle an impact
on unemployment flows, lowering both unemployment inflows and unemployment
outflows. The obvious result is an increased proportion of long term unemployment.
What evidence do we have for this? According to Table 3.4. there is no clear
relationship between the stringency of employment protection legislation (EPL) and
job turnover flows. In particular, higher job protection does not seem to imply (or be
correlated with) lower job turnover, irrespective of whether one uses single-
dimension measures (e.g. regulations on regular contracts or severance entitlements)
or overall indices of job protection (e.g. IOE, 1985, and Bertola, 1990). As a matter
of fact, the rank correlations between EPL measures and job turnover show the
expected sign, but it is not statistically significant except in one case.
Evidence on the impact of job turnover on unemployment is not conclusive either,
but, as Table 3.5. shows, there seems to be some indication that higher job turnover
implies more inflows into unemployment and a lower incidence of long-term
unemployment. The correlation between job turnover on the one hand and
unemployment rate, outflows from unemployment, and net employment changes on
the other is again not statistically significant, although with the expected sign.
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Table 3.4. Rank correlation between various cross-country rankings of measures of
employment protection legislation and job turnover
All establishments
(private sector)
All establishments
(manufacturing)
Regulations governing permanent workers (a) -0.44 -0.23
Regulations on temporary workers (a)   -0.79* -0.41
Maximum severance pay and notice for
        dismissal of permanent worker (b)
 0.54 -0.38
IOE (c) -0.65 -0.52
Bertola (d) -0.58 -0.26
Sources: (a) Grubb and Wells (1993); (b) OECD (1993); (c) IOE (1985); and (d) Bertola
(1990). * denotes significance at the 5% level.
Table 3.5. Rank correlation between job turnover (private sector) and unemployment
All establishments Continuing establishments
Unemployment rate -0.32   0.00
Inflows into unemployment  0.22     0.61*
Outflows from unemployment  0.30   0.47
Incidence of long term unemployment   -0.62*  -0.56
Net employment change -0.40 -
Source: OECD (1996). * denotes significance at the 5% level.
Table 3.6. Job turnover flows
Portugal
(1983-94)
Italy
(1984-92)
Germany
(1983-90)
France
(1984-92)
U.K.
(1985-91)
Canada
(1983-91)
U.S.A.
(1984-91)
Manufacturing Economy
JC 11.4 14.9 12.3   9.0 13.9   8.7 14.5 13.0
JD 11.8 13.7 11.1   7.5 13.2   6.6 11.9 10.4
JT 23.2 28.6 23.4 16.5 27.1 15.3 26.4 23.4
Sources: OECD (1994a) and Portugal (1999). JC, JD, and JT denote job creation, job
destruction, and gross job turnover, respectively. The values are in percentage of total
employment (annual averages).
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Much more evidence is therefore required in order to establish more robust
relationships between labour reallocation, unemployment flows, and employment
protection. In any event, since labour institutions frame both wage determination and
employment, what matters is the entire system of labour relations. By looking
exclusively at any single dimension, there is the risk of missing crucial aspects
connecting wage determination and employment protection; this linkage being at the
core of observed cross-country patterns of labour adjustment. To illustrate this point
we compare job turnover statistics in Portugal and core OECD countries, in Table
3.6. Although we should bear in mind the usual qualifications on data sources and
comparability, one major point seems to stand out. There are no visible differences in
gross job turnover between these countries.  (This point has recently been challenged
by Blanchard and Portugal, 2001), who claim that employment protection has impact
in labour reallocation if one looks at more disaggregate (quarterly) data, but more
evidence in a broader set of countries is required before generalisations can be
made.)
4. Putting Poland in perspective
The economic problems Poland had to face at the beginning of the transition program
(in 1989) were in many aspects similar to the ones Portugal and Spain had to meet in
the 1970s, in particular those related to the reallocation of labour from agriculture
and manufacturing to the service sector. As Table 4.1. shows, the employment
figures in Poland (in 1989) were approximately the same as the (non-weighted)
average of Portugal and Spain in 1975 (roughly the beginning of the transition period
in these two countries). Despite this parallelism, the differences in GDP figures were
substantial, with industry output in Poland being twice that of the OECD average.
More noticeably, in all three countries the agriculture sector was, in comparison with
the 1988 OECD average, clearly over-represented, both in terms of output and
employment.
In Poland, the transition from an agriculture-and-industry-based economy to a
service oriented one, was accompanied by a program of privatisation aimed at
transforming very rapidly from a centrally-planned economy to a market-oriented
economy. Although on a different scale, the two Iberian countries have also been
through an intensive program of liberalisation during transition, especially in the case
of Portugal where, in a period of two decades the size of the public enterprise sector
was reduced from a 23% share in GDP in 1975 to 8% in 1997 (from 19 % to 3% in
terms of total employment). As shown in Table 4.2., in one decade, the size of the
public enterprise sector in Poland was reduced from 53% to 29% in terms of
employment share (a reduction from 72% to 45% in GDP share between 1995 and
1999).
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Table 4.1. Sectoral GDP and employment for Portugal, Spain, and Poland
GDP Employment
Agr Ind Ser Agr Ind Ser
Portugal 1975 14 39 47 34 34 32
Spain 1975   9 37 54 22 38 40
Poland 1989 15 61 24 28 35 37
OECD 1988   6 33 61   3 33 64
Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators. Values given as percentages.
Table 4.2. The size of the public enterprise sector in Portugal and Poland
Share in GDP Share in employment
Portugal Before 1975 8 12
After 1975 23 19
1988 20 6
1997 8 3
Poland 1989 - 53
1995 72 -
1999 45 29
Source: Ministério das Finanças (1998) and OECD Country Surveys – Poland.
4.1. The transition process
The early stages of the transition process in Poland were marked by a severe
reduction in output growth (-11.5% in 1990 and -7.0% in 1991), caused by the
collapse of the socialist economy and by the shock therapy approach inflicted on an
emerging market economy.
Not surprisingly, adjusting the size of the industrial sector was the most painful task.
In five years (from 1988 to 1992) the share in GDP of industrial output dropped from
more than 60% to 34%. Neither the labour nor the product markets were ready for
such an enormous transformation, and the result was a massive process of job
destruction, especially in heavy industries. From being an unknown phenomenon,
unemployment, which was actually forbidden during the communist era, rapidly
reached the two-figure level (14.4% in 1994, Labour Force Survey).
In Portugal, as we have shown in section 2, industrial restructuring was followed
from the beginning (1975-77) by changes in the labour relations system which
enabled firms to adapt to new market conditions. As a result of an early settlement of
major labour regulations, all major labour market outcomes were remarkably stable
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throughout an entire period of more than two decades, in which the country had to
face, we recall, (i) a political revolution, a decolonisation process, and a massive
program of nationalisation of major firms in key sectors of the economy in 1974 and
1975; (ii) the preparations required to join the EEC in 1986; and (iii) the adjustment
to an economic community of more industrialised countries following EEC
membership.
In Spain, the early successes enjoyed in the period 1975-77 proved illusory if not
counterproductive. With no serious social unrest to cope with, there was no massive
pressure towards any major change in labour relations until the 1980s. Moreover, the
changes in labour regulations introduced in the 1980s, seem to have fallen short of
those required to respond to increased competition from abroad and to the industrial
restructuring necessary for successful EEC membership on the employment
/unemployment front.
In Poland, all major labour market reforms were introduced in 1990 and 1991:
legislation on collective and individual dismissals, the right to strike, works councils,
and collective bargaining. However, without any real experience of the functioning
of price adjustment mechanisms, the reforms sounded, in many cases, like a western
extravaganza. If, in Spain, the introduction of fixed-term contracts was an escape
route to ease the pressure on firms anxious to have more labour flexibility, in Poland
massive unemployment created by the complete disruption of the economy forced
authorities to implement generous unemployment safety nets and an arsenal of
Active Labour Market Policies (ALMPs) to which only the more advanced western
economies were familiar with.
4.2. The role of labour market institutions
In the mid-1990s, Poland started the second phase of the transition period, which
included an intensive program of privatisation and preparation for E.U. accession.
Table 4.3. summarises  information on major labour outcomes during this period. For
comparison, information on Portugal and Spain has also been included. We note that,
due to the use of different definitions, figures on EMPPOP and LFPR variables are
not strictly comparable with those given in Table 3.1. The data source is the Labour
Force Survey.
The first relevant point is that employment-population and labour force-population
ratios in Poland are much closer to Portugal than to Spain (Portugal is slightly over
the OECD average in both categories). Unemployment in Poland is much higher than
in Portugal but clearly below the Spanish rate by a factor of (almost) two. In Poland,
the unemployment rate is also slightly lower than the corresponding value in the first
part of the Spanish transition (i.e. the period 1975-77).
The period 1993-97 is also characterised by very strong output growth (the average
growth rate in the 1994-98 period is 6%). Given that employment has increased at a
much  slower  pace  (1.1%  per  year),  the  result  is  very  strong  growth  in  labour
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Table 4.3. Labour market outcomes in Poland, Portugal, and Spain: 1993-97
Poland Portugal Spain
EMPPOP 58.4 62.8 47.9
UNRATE 12.8  7.1 22.5
LFPR 67.3 67.7 61.8
Source : OECD (1999). The employment-population ratio is computed using people
from 15 to 64 years old (16 to 64 in the case of Spain).
Table 4.4. Relative position on strictness of labour regulations (late 1990s)
Portugal Spain Poland
Regular contracts (individual dismissals) 27 18 12
Temporary employment 21 22 11
Collective dismissals 20 13 22
Overall index 26 22 10
Source : OECD (1999). The total number of countries in the sample is 27 (26 in the
temporary employment category).
productivity. On the other hand, and because output has shown greater variability
than employment, the very steep pattern of the relationship between output growth
and employment growth may indicate lack of labour market flexibility.
To assess the role of labour market institutions and regulations in Poland more
directly, Table 4.4. presents the OECD rankings on strictness of employment
protection regulations. A summary of the main features of the Polish job protection
system is also included in the appendix (Annex Tables 1 and 2). As mentioned
above, the computation and interpretation of these ‘reputation’ indices has been
subject to intense debate, but looking at the position of Poland there seems to be no
apparent reason for concern. Having said that, when considering the favourable
overall index – tenth out of 27 countries – it should not be ignored that the scoring
exercises in general involve ad hoc weighting procedures. The collective dismissals
score is just an example. It may well be the case that the actual combination of strict
firing restrictions on mass layoffs with restrictive practices on wage setting has a
much larger impact on labour market outcomes than the reported overall index
suggests and this should be a matter of some concern.
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5. Policy Issues
The performance of the labour market is the key factor that distinguishes success
from failure in economic transition as labour markets are required a) to be flexible, to
allow new allocations of factors; b) to be stable, to prevent workers from income
losses; and c) to have low unemployment spells to guarantee that workers do not bear
all the costs of mobility. Wage flexibility and wage differentials are also required, to
induce sufficient labour mobility, and reforms must keep incentives to work at a high
level to avoid unsustainable reductions in labour force participation. The challenges
to labour policy made during transition (and in general) are thus very far from trivial
since they imply difficult choices among obviously conflicting goals.
“The OECD Jobs Study” and the follow-up report “Implementing the OECD Jobs
Strategy” has offered a comprehensive recipe for labour recommendations which
have been applied to a wide variety of countries. Very broadly, they include
recommendations in favour of (i) decentralised wage setting, to stimulate wage
growth in correspondence with gains in productivity; (ii) non- indexation of minimum
wages to average wages, to avoid damage to the employability of lower-skilled
workers; (iii) low unemployment benefits (insurance and assistance benefits) and
strict eligibility rules (including means-tested benefits) “to make work pay” as much
as possible; and (iv) strict monitoring of ALMP measures.
In this study we have assessed how changes in job protection rules were
implemented in Portugal and Spain during transition from dictatorship to E.E.C. (and
E.U.) membership. Although employment protection must not be taken in isolation,
we believe the differences in labour market performance in Portugal and Spain make
it clear that firing restrictions had a decisive role in the observed labour market
developments. In particular, they show that firing restrictions on regular contracts
need to be co-ordinated with regulations on temporary work in order to improve
labour market outcomes. Given the difficulties in implementing (and “refreshing”)
structural changes, it is of key importance to avoid misguided legislative
interventions, since the very first steps of any reform package very often become the
founding policies, with a decisive and permanent impact in framing future
developments.
How useful can be the Iberian experience to Poland? In the first instance, there is a
clear indication that policy choices must be well defined, with long-term objectives
clearly stated to avoid being “stuck in the middle of the river” (Bertola, and Ichino,
1995). In particular, it seems that if a given country’s objective is greater flexibility
in labour shedding, firing restrictions and regulations regarding regular contracts
should be combined with those governing fixed-term contracts. For, as the Spanish
case clearly illustrates, simply using the latter as an escape route to ease the pressure
arising from stringent employment regulations on typical, open-ended contracts has
proven to be a mistake, largely because it involves the risk of introducing higher
wage rigidity and separate (dual) labour markets with lower mobility between them.
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The combination of a flexible regime of fixed-term contracts with adequate
regulations regarding mass layoffs, which provides firms with sufficient room for the
necessary labour adjustment required by large scale restructuring, has proven
successful during the Portuguese transition period in that it has enabled the country
to maintain an above average performance in terms of unemployment, labour force
participation, and output growth. There is no “Portuguese Miracle” to call. Output
growth rate although higher than average is not spectacular. The country has been
able however to make steady progress in many fronts without major disruptions. If
Poland is to consider a similar route, it needs to improve its position in relation to
collective dismissals and maintain its current regulations on fixed-term contracts,
avoiding the recent easing of the latter as suggested in the 1999-2000 OECD survey
on Poland.
The direction which Poland should take in terms of unemployment benefits seems
quite obvious. When both the unemployment insurance benefits and assistance
benefits were initially introduced in Portugal (in 1975), there were related to
minimum wages as opposed to average wages (only in 1985, unemployment
insurance benefits became related to past-earnings). This is still the way the
Portuguese unemployment benefit system works. As minimum wages have never
been indexed to average wages, Portugal has been able to keep the principle of
“make work pay” very alive.
The Spanish approach has however been very different, not only in terms of
minimum wages, but also in terms of wage setting and unemployment benefits, and
this has resulted in a considerably more compressed wage structure. In this context,
the OECD recommendation for Poland on the need to improve its decentralised
bargaining must be kept in mind.
The demographic trends in Poland point to a significant increase in the labour force,
while restructuring is largely unfinished business in a wide variety of sectors.
Agriculture still holds 25% of total employment and helps sustain substantial levels
of unemployment in rural areas. It is therefore required even more attention to
current labour market policies to assure that the country can indeed maintain its
current leading status among the transition countries in the years to come.
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Annex Table 1: Individual dismissals – Spain
Definition  (a) Notice  (b) Severance pay  (b) Exemptions
Law 10/3/1980
(Workers’ Statute)
Requires the dismissal to be fair, i.e. based
on disciplinary reasons and objective
grounds.
0 months For disciplinary reasons: no
severance payment is
required.
For objective grounds: 20
days of wages for each year
of service.
The dismissal for objective grounds
can be used only by firms with less
than 50 workers.
Law 19/5/1994 3 months The dimissal for objective grounds
must affect less than 10% of the total
workforce (otherwise the firm will
have to follow the administrative
procedure for collective dismissals)
Decree 17/5/97 Economic, technological, organisational and
productive reasons, including changes in
cyclical demand, constitute now
“justifiable” grounds for dismissal.
30 days 2/3 of a month’s pay per
year of service.
Source: Bertola, Boeri, and Cazes (1999) and OECD (1999). (a) Objective grounds cannot be attributed to the worker and they include economic, technological,
organizational and productive reasons ( “objective dismissal”).  In practice, however, and because “justifiable” grounds were vague in the law prior to 1997, individual
dismissals based on economic grounds were precluded or resulted in prohibitive severance pay settlements; (b) notice and severance pay for a typical worker with 10 years
of service.
Annex Table 1 (cont.): Individual dismissals – Poland and Portugal
Definition Notice (a) Severance pay (a)
Poland Fair dismissals include reasons attributed to
the worker and to economic redundancy.
90 days Usually none.
Portugal Prior to 1989, individual dismissals were
only allowed on disciplinary grounds.
Economic grounds and lack of professional
or technical capability are now valid reasons
for individual dismissals.
60 days 1 month per year of service.
Source: OECD (1999). (a) Notice and severance pay for a typical worker with 10 years of service.
Annex Table 1 (cont.): Collective dismissals – Spain
Definition Severance pay  Procedural obligations Social plan
Law 10/3/1980
(Workers’ Statute)
A collective dismissal is grounded
on economic and technological
reasons. There is a threshold of two
or more employees (for firms with
less than 50 employees.
No regulations. Firms with
less than 25 workers pay
only 60% of the severance
payment agreed. The
remaining is paid by the
“Wage Guarantee Fund”.
Information and consultation with the
trade union and the labour authority. If
an agreement with the legal
representatives is reached, it is notified to
the labour authority who certifies.
Otherwise, the case is left to the labour
authority, who has to decide whether the
procedure is accepted or rejected.
Because, labour authorities oppose in
general the dismissals, employers always
seek an agreement.
Length: 30 days bargaining period with
workers’ representatives; 30 days for the
labour authority to reach a decision. (a)
Not required.
Law 2/8/1984 For firms with less than 25
workers, the “Wage
Guarantee Fund” pays 40
per cent of  the legal
severance payment.
There is often an agreement
with the trade union to
provide a plan for
professional qualification
and benefits.
Law 19/5/1994 Organisational and production
causes were added to the previous
economic and technological
reasons.
There is a threshold (within a
period of 90 days) of 10 workers
for firms with less than 100
employees, 30 workers for firms
with more than 300 workers, and
10 per cent of the workers for firms
with employees between 100 and
300.
30 days for the bargaining period and 15
for the labour authority decision.
A social plan is required for
firms with more than 50
employees.
Source: Bertola, Boeri, and Cazes (1999) and OECD (1999). (a) There has been a sustained trend in the jurisprudence according to which the lack of administrative
authorisation makes the dismissals null and void (workers are reinstalled and paid the outstanding wages)
Annex Table 1 (cont.): Collective dismissals – Poland and Portugal
Definition Severance pay (a)  Procedural obligations Social plan
Poland The threshold is defined as
follows:
10 percent of workers in firms
with less than 1000 employees;
100 workers in firms with at
least 1000 employees.
2 months per year of service. Obligation to inform and consult
with the trade union and the local
employment office.
Length: 45 days.
An agreement has to be
reached with the trade
union on alternatives to
redundancy and ways to
mitigate the effects.
Portugal There is a threshold of 2 (5)
workers in firms with less
(more) than 50 employees,
within a period of 90 days.
1 month of average basic
earnings per year of service.
Obligation to inform and consult
with works council or trade union
delegations and labour authorities.
Since 1989, authorisation by the
labour authority is not required
before implementation of
dismissals, nor a written agreement
has to be reached.
Length: 75 days if an agreement
with workers’ representatives is
reached; 90 days otherwise.
There is consultation with
trade unions on
alternatives to redundancy,
selection standards and
ways to mitigate the
effects.
Source: OECD (1999). (a) Severance pay for a typical worker with 10 years of service.
Annex Table 1 (cont.): Regulation on fixed-term contracts
Valid cases Maximum number of
successive renewals
Maximum cumulated
duration
Portugal Permitted under a specific
set of circumstances.
3 3 years  (2 for new activities and
business startups).
Spain Permitted under a specific
set of circumstances.
3 3 years.
Poland There are no restrictions to
the use of fixed-term
contracts.
2 No limit.
Source: OECD (1999). Fixed-term contracts are allowed in all countries in objective situations, such as specific projects, seasonal work,
temporary replacement of permanent workers and exceptional workload. A distinctive cross-country feature is whether or not the law permits
other cases and under which circumstances. The most flexible regimes have no restrictions at all.
Annex Table 1 (cont.): Regulation on temporary work agency employment
Definition
Portugal It is restricted to “objective situations” (business startups, lunching of new activities of uncertain
duration, recruitment of workers in search for their first job and long-term unemployed, inter al.).
Spain Legal since 1994. It is limited to “objective situations.”
Poland No restrictions.
Source: OECD (1999).
Annex Table 2: Unemployment insurance benefits in Portugal and Spain: main changes (1975-92)
1975 1977 1983 1984 1985 1989 1992
Spain
Eligibility (a) 6 (in the previous 4 years) 12 ( in the preceding 6 years)
Maximum length (b) 24 months
Replacement ratio 0.675 of the gross wage
Lower bound: 100% of
the statutory minimum
wage (SMW).
Upper bound: 2.2xSMW
0.625 of the gross wage
Lower bound: 100% of  SMW
Upper bound: 2.2xSMW
Effective coverage (c) Around 60%, including
beneficiaries from
unemployment assistance.
Around 40%, including
assistance benefits.
Portugal
Eligibility (a) 18 (in the previous 2 years)
Maximum length (b) 6 12 15 31 25
Replacement ratio (d) 2/3xSMW 0.75xSMW 0.9xSMW 0.94xSMW 65%  of basic earnings or
0.98xSMW
Effective coverage (c) Around 60% , including
assistance benefits (introduced
in 1989).
Sources: Addison and Teixeira (1997), Bentolila and Blanchard (1990), and Bover et al. (2000). (a) Minimum number of months of work; (b) values for a typical worker,
defined as a worker employed in manufacturing, with 10 years of service and in a family unit of 3 to 5 persons. We also assume that the unemployed worker exhausts the
24- month period of eligibility; (c) values on effective coverage of unemployment benefits should be taken very carefully. The OECD Jobs Study, for example, reports two
indicators that differ substantially for a given country. For Portugal and Spain, in 1991, the percentage of unemployed people reporting receipt of benefit in the EC Labour
Force Survey is 17% an 29%, respectively, while the ratio of the number of unemployment beneficiaries (registered) to the total number of unemployed (LFS) is 41% and
59%, respectively. Prior to 1989 reform, only a very tiny portion of the unemployed received unemployment benefits in Portugal; (d) the scale controls for the ratio of the
minimum wage to the average wage. SMW is the statutory minimum wage.
Annex Table 2 (cont.): Unemployment insurance benefits in Poland: main changes (1989-97)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Eligibility Registered, non-
old-age, no farm.
Employed for at
least 6 months
in last year but
admits many
exceptions.
Employed for 365
days in the
previous 18
months.
Duration No limit. 12 months 12 months;
18 months in
special cases.
6, 12 or 18
dependent on the
local rate of
unemployment
and duration of
unemployment.
Replacement
ratio
70% of previous
monthly wage in
the first 3 months;
50% for the next
6 months; and
40% thereafter.
36% of the
average wage of
previous
quarter.
52% of average
wage in special
cases.
Flat Zl 340 per
month  (indexed
to CPI and
defined as a
given
percentage
(about 30%) of
average wages).
Effective
coverage
73% 60% 30%
Source: OECD Country Surveys – Poland, and IMF Staff Country Report – Poland (several issues).
